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Facebook’s	light	approach	to	corporate	governance
Amongst	the	regular	challenges	of	modern	governance	are	the	corporate	scandals.	These	have	affected	almost
every	business	sector,	most	recently	of	course	the	so-called	disruptive	Big	Tech	companies.	It	seems	none	of	these
social	media	technology	companies	are	exempt	from	scandal.	Google	have	been	accused	of	abusing	the	dominance
of	its	Android	smart	phone	operating	system	and	Apple	were	hit	by	Europe’s	largest	tax	penalty.
The	current	scandal	du	jour	involving	Facebook	–	‘data	scraping’	from	users	for	third-party	political	campaigning	in
America,	UK	and	Europe	–	is	particularly	damning	as	it	is	one	in	a	long	line	of	‘errors	of	judgement’	from	its	founder,
leader	and	CEO	Mark	Zuckerberg	and	his	apparently	supine	executive	team.	The	current	imbroglio	must	rank	as	one
of	the	most	serious	for	the	company	–	especially	given	how	unusual	it	is	for	a	CEO	to	actually	be	summoned	to
appear	before	Congress	to	be	grilled	by	the	elected	representatives	of	the	American	people	to	(notionally)	fully
account	for	their	decisions	and	actions.	Sadly,	those	requiring	news	of	concrete	action	to	stop	and/or	mitigate	future
transgressions	by	Facebook	found	little	to	excite	from	the	500	–	often	painfully	easy,	often	dolly	drop	–	questions
posed	by	US	lawmakers.
The	fact	that	Facebook	was	known	for	questionable	tax	issues	in	the	UK	should	not,	of	course,	go	unnoticed	(in	2014
they	paid	£5	000	in	tax,	despite	making	billions	of	profit	and	the	UK	being	a	very	important	market).	As	we	all	know	or
are	getting	to	better	understand	and	appreciate,	notionally	at	the	heart	of	the	Facebook	business	model	is	the	claim
that	consumers	can	trust	the	company	to	look	after	its	data.
Sadly,	this	claim	looks	at	best	increasingly	specious	and,	at	worst,	deliberately	misleading.	As	with	many	other
scandals,	one	of	the	major	contributory	issues	is	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	Facebook	company	board,	especially	as	it
relates	to	the	key	metrics	of	independent	analysis	and	advice	from	its	executives	and	non-executive	directors	alike	–
should	they	exist	in	any	meaningful	way.	In	general	terms,	the	consequences	of	this	lack	of	appropriate	governance,
oversight	and	supervision	is	reduced	shareholder	value,	job	reductions	and	reputational	damage,	along	with	reduced
morale	amongst	employees	and	anger	amongst	users	and	lawmakers.
In	the	case	of	Facebook,	it	appears	that	the	board	is	ineffective	in	a	number	of	important	areas.	Firstly	regarding
strategy.	The	business	is	not	diversified	–	compared	to	Google	or	Amazon,	for	instance	–	while	its	current	product
offerings	rely	totally	on	the	trust	of	consumers	in	data	protection	and	their	ongoing	confidence	in	that.	Almost	all	of	its
revenue	eggs	comes	from	the	same	basket,	namely	advertising.
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Though	never	slow	to	play	the	victim	or	issue	heartfelt	mea	culpas	not	worth	the	comment	streams	they	appear	in,	it
is	a	truism	that	Facebook	are	victims	of	their	own	‘success’.	Others	may	deem	this	a	sign	of	lack	of	global	regulation
and	governmental	influence	or	control	–		in	that	they	grew	too	big	too	quickly.	In	the	FT,	John	Gapper	writes	that
Zuckerberg	cannot	even	control	his	own	creation.	At	the	Congress	hearing	he	apologised	many	times	for	the	havoc
he	has	unleashed	at	Facebook.	The	Board	had	failed	to	plan	for	such	fast	growth	and	had	not	identified	the	issues
which	it	would	face.	It	is		a	situation	massively	compounded	by	Zuckerberg	occupying	–	as	the	American	corporate
governance	regulatory	environment	permits	–	both	the	roles	of	Chairman	and	CEO	simultaneously,	apparently
without	the	difficulty	of	naysayers	or		contrary	opinions	in	the	rush	to	extract	and	maximise	huge	profits.	For	Gapper,
this	has	lately	left	Zuckerberg	looking	“more	like	apprentice	than	sorcerer”.
Secondly,	regarding	risk	management,	the	Facebook	board	failed	to	have	a	plan	to	deal	with	an	incident	such	as	the
(disputed)	Cambridge	Analytica	data	scraping	(and	networked	dumping)	scandal.	Even	now	the	company	is
struggling	to	deal	with	its	consequences.	When	inevitably	caught	bad	acting,	Facebook	has	either	underestimated	or
failed	to	anticipate	the	reaction	of	people	globally	(and	that	of	their	elected	representatives),	which	could	lead	to	a
change	in	the	law	that	could	really	affect	the	super	profits	and	possibly	the	viability	of	their	increasingly	aggressive
business	model	–	though	we	will	all	believe	this	when	we	see	this	come	to	pass	(preferably	with	teeth	and	financial
consequences).	For	example,	limiting	the	use	of	data	as	LinkedIn	does	or,	possibly,	requiring	consumers	to	pay,
which	would	have	an	enormous	impact	on	their	current	very	high	margins	of	profit.
A	further	significant	contributory	factor	to	Facebook	problems	is	the	light	to	non-existent	touch	approach	to	corporate
governance	symbolized	by	the	combined	chairman	and	CEO	role.	For	a	company	with	international	pretensions,	let
alone	one	that	straddles	the	world	globally,	not	even	bothering	to	appear	to	take	account	of	best	practice	is	an
arrogance	borne	of	a	management	bubble	with	almost	zero	effective	regulation,	supervision	and	oversight.
A	pragmatic	optimist	could	make	the	case	for	possible	much-needed	positive	corporate	governance	change	at	the
leadership	and	executive	level	at	Facebook.	Notional	or	actual	legislative	gatekeepers	with	real	teeth	is	something
that	would	also	be	a	useful	corrective	for	other	all-powerful	founders	of	disruptive	social	media	companies	–	like
Twitter,	Google	and	Apple	et	al.	This	would	be	doubly	handy.	There	is	no	time	like	the	present,	since	these
companies	collectively	enjoy	sacred-cow,	most	favoured	status	with	worldwide	stock	markets,	venture	capital	and
private	equity	investors,	as	well	as	(wannabe)	shareholders	–	without,	it	seems,	any	government	being	able	to
provide	any	influence	upon	them.
Sadly,	along	with	the	oft-cited	disruption,	these	digital	titans	invariably	lack	independent	chairmen/chairwomen	and
are	often	led	by	a	single	shareholder	or	a	small	cadre	of	equally	unaccountable	majority	shareholders.		If	Facebook
were	to	care	enough	to	set	an	example	in	sincerity	about	corporate	governance	best	practice,	they	would	briefly
proactively	take	control	of	their	own	messaging	and	positioning	in	the	global	(media)	news	agenda	sufficiently	to
announce	immediate	but	voluntary	change	to	let	some	air	into	their	deliberately	and	rigorously	closed	structure	of
their	shareholding	and	management	bubbles.
This	would	be	a	wise	move	before	global	legislative	strengthening	finally	forces	this	more	21st-century	corporate
governance	reality	upon	them.	They	should	also	immediately	dilute	their	voting	share	ownership,	and	also	employ
and	empower	independent	directors	to	advise,	guide	and	supervise	their	strategies,	policies	and	procedures,	as	well
as	ring-fence	their	current	dominance	and	success	more	openly	and	equitably.
What	are	the	specific	better	governance	steps	I	would	recommend	for	Facebook?	Here	in	the	UK,	it	is	now	a
requirement	for	public	companies	to	have	an	external	board	evaluation	carried	out	every	three	years.	When	it	comes
to	conducting	a	board	evaluation	the	checklist	issues	that	usually	need	to	be	covered	include:	
Overall	Impression	of	the	Board
Dynamics	of	the	board
Culture	and	climate	in	the	boardroom
Sense	of	teamwork
Quality	of	discussion	/	balance	of	debate
Organisation	of	the	Board
Agendas,	and	formation	of	agendas;	coverage	of	the	right	topics
Reporting,	including	of	board	committees
Meeting	frequency	and	length
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Formal	processes	and	duties
Informal	processes	(including	board	dinners)
Strategy	sessions
Information	and	support	materials;	company	secretariat	and	support
Committee	Organisation:	Audit,	Remuneration,	Health,	Safety	&	Environment,
Nomination
Agendas
Meeting	frequency	and	length
Membership,	internal	attendees	and	adviser	attendees
Information	and	support	materials
Topics	for	the	board	versus	topics	for	the	committees
Board	Composition
Size
Balance	(including	number	of	executives)
Skill	sets
Independence
Rotation
Board	Involvement	and	Engagement
Directors’	knowledge	of	the	business
Relationships	with	management
Contact	outside	the	boardroom
Strategy	development
Induction	and	training	for	new	directors
Communication	with	Shareholders/Stakeholders
Shareholder	messages
Analyst	meetings	and	reports
AGM	(annual	general	meeting)
Chairman’s	role	with	shareholders/stakeholders
Other	Directors’	role	with	shareholders/stakeholders
Looking	forward
Succession	planning	(Executive	and	Independent)
Directors’	development	needs
Overall	Board	Effectiveness
Progress	since	last	board	evaluation
Fulfilment	of	fiduciary	duties
Ethics,	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	and	Environment
Compliance	with	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code
Expectations	placed	on	directors	including	their	responsibilities	for	governance	and	remuneration
Support	to	the	business
Checks	and	balances
Short-	and	long-term	health	of	the	business
Colleagues
Chairman
Senior	Independent	Director
Chairmen
Independent	Directors
Overall	Impression	of	the	Board
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Executive	Directors Overall	Impression	of	the	Board
The	above	checklist	would	be	an	excellent	place	for	Facebook	to	embark	on	their	self-confessed	road	of	repentance
and	contrition.	However,	and	that	said,	with	Mark	Zuckerberg’s	recently	heavily	scripted	apologetic	mood	music	to
Congress	still	echoing	in	our	ears	worldwide,	the	signs	of	better	governance	and	transparency	moving	forwards	don’t
look	positive.	If	Facebook’s	actions	are	anything	to	further	judge	them	by:	allegedly	for	purely	coincidental
housekeeping	and	‘administrative’	reasons,	the	company	is	transferring	data	currently	stored	in	Eire	(subject	to	EU
legislation),	to	much	laxer	regulatory	environments	–	to	circumvent	the	EU’s	introduction	of	its	General	Data
Protection	Regulation	(GDPR)	on	23	May.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	draws	insights	from	the	author’s	book		The	Independent	Director:	The	Non-Executive	Director’s
Guide	to	Effective	Board	Presence,	published	by	Palgrave	Macmillan.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
Featured	image	credit:	Mark	Zuckerberg,	by	Maurizio	Pesce,	under	a	CC-BY-2.0	licence
When	you	leave	a	comment,	you’re	agreeing	to	our	Comment	Policy.
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